Gas Turbine

Types of ventilation – Induced draft ventilation – Turbine ,Acc module – Positive ventilation- LGB, Exhaust Ventilation System Design features †¢ Induced Draft Ventilation †¢ Number of compartments †¢ Accessory compartment †¢ Turbine compartment †¢ Aft compartment †¢ Generator Enclosure †¢ 2 X 100 % Roof mounted centrifugal fans †¢ Auto change over †¢ Fan outlet gravity dampers, CO2 dampers and silencers provided †¢ Enclosure Air inlet hoods with filter panels †¢ Slow cool down fan provided for Turbine compartmentFan sizing Accessory compartment Heat load criteria: †¢ Q = Heat Rejection = 104000 (BTU/Hr) = 436. 8 ( Kcal/min) †¢ Design compartment temp – 600 C at ambient of 430 C †¢ Fan provided : 2 x 10,000 CFM at 3. 5 inch WC static pressure †¢ The calculated temp raise with selected air flow 7. 80 C †¢ Static Pressure selected considering drop across suction filter, inlet, ex it, silencer and ducting Number of air changes criteria: †¢ Volume Of the Acc Comp = 278 m3 †¢ Number of Air change/Hr = 60 (Meets NFPA and DEP 31. 29. 70. 31 requirements)Fan sizing Turbine compartment Heat load criteria: †¢ Q = Heat Rejection = 1273469 (BTU/Hr) = 5348 ( Kcal/min) †¢ Design compartment temp – 1200 C at ambient of 430 C †¢ Fan provided : 2 x 26,000 CFM at 3. 5 inch WC static pressure †¢ The calculated temp raise with selected air flow 300 C †¢ Static Pressure selected considering drop across suction filter, inlet, exit, silencer and ducting Number of air changes criteria: †¢ Volume Of the Acc Comp = 215 m3 †¢ Number of Air change/Hr = 185 (Meets NFPA and DEP 31. 29. 70. 31 requirements)Vent Fan Drawing Typical Accessory Compartment Fan Curve †¢ Fan BHP : 5. 53 kw †¢ Motor selected- 8 kw †¢ Motor Data: †¢ 4pole – 415V,3Ph TEFC †¢ Motor ambient Temp. 650 C †¢ Insulation class â₠¬â€œ H ( Temp raise limited to class B) †¢ Flame proof NEC Class 1 Div 2 Gr C&D Turbine Compartment Fan Curve †¢ Fan BHP : 15. 45 kw †¢ Motor selected- 19 kw †¢ Motor Data: †¢ 4pole – 415V,3Ph TEFC †¢ Motor ambient Temp. 650 C †¢ Insulation class – H ( Temp raise limited to class B) †¢ Flame proof NEC Class 1 Div 2 Gr C&D Exhaust Frame Blower (Fr6) †¢ †¢ †¢ †¢ †¢ Two motor driven centrifugal Blowers Inlet screen & silencer Air to turbine shell, exhaust frame via strut passages (Annular space) Flow:2470 CFM with two fans in operation Emergency:1860 CFM with one fan in operation Motor rating :50HP GT Auxiliaries GT Auxiliaries EXHAUST FRAME BLOWERS EXHAUST FRAME BLOWER GT Auxiliaries MIST ELIMINATOR Removes oil mist entrained in the LO vapor – Flow rate 😕 SCFM – Demister pads(8No’s)-SS316 wire mesh – Coalescing filter element(99. 97% for droplets and particles 0. micron a nd larger) – Outlet oil content not more than 5ppm by weight – Centrifugal blowers (2 No’s) and motors(11kw each) OUT LET FILTER CASING INLET BLOWER & MOTOR GT Auxiliaries GT Auxiliaries MIST ELIMINATOR – High speed rotating machinery: High temperature and shearing action in bearings generates a large volume of very fine oil mist (droplets) plus a considerable amount of vapor – Oil mist and oil vapor is vented from the lube oil tank, it causes a visible plume – Stringent environmental laws and regulations at all government levels – Coalescers combine small aerosols through the filter media to form large droplets.

Managerment

Do you agree with Vim's employment response to competition from software development contractors in India like Wiper that are expanding into IT consulting services? Why or why not? Vim's strategy appears oriented around â€Å"growing the pie. † If It can Increase Its products' user base by lower costs, It should be able to Increase demand for Its consulting services. However, low-cost consulting groups are ready to fill this void. Therefore, IBM will need to continue Its expansion Into low-cost labor markets.In Dalton, this expansion will need to embrace low cost markets outside of India. These markets Include Russia, China, Indonesia, and Mexico. Will Vim's plan to give away some of Its IT assets and Intellectual property and Increase Its support of open- source software products like Linux be a successful growth strategy In the â€Å"brutally competitive marketplace† in which It operates? Why or why not? IBM has expertise in supporting these applications. By lowering licensing costs or aging the software free, IBM should be able to increase its user base.With a broader user base, the demand for support should grow. The strategy appears logical. Of course, other organizations may try to meet this demand, but Vim's low- cost labor sources will help ensure its competitiveness. In addition, low-cost labor will help further increase demand for this software, thereby ensuring growth. However, this strategy will take on a whole new twist as the global economy continues o grow and labor costs rise around the world.History also supports Vim's growth assumptions. Bill Gates found his BASIC interpreter the De facto standard once users found they could easily find free pirated copies. Likewise, the low cost MEMO deals he made for the Windows operating system ensured a user base of over 100 million computers. The computing public values free, high quality software, and many conservative organizations will recognize the MM name as quality assurance. All of th is will encourage growth.

A Modest Proposal By Jonathan Swift Essay Satire, Jonathan Swift, A M

Throughout the essay the narrator ironically focuses on the deep rooted political, moral and social problems of the society. The writer at one instance does not even feels pity on the poor and malnourished infants and points out ironically that these infants are no only way to get rid of the problems. His proposal that carries some of the most inappropriate and horrible social implication is vehemently defended by his arguments. Though he is presenting a proposal to end the woes and problems of the country but the manner and the condition that he has been mentioning throughout the essay seems to be very cruel and inhuman. He is very effectively defending the idea of his proposal and also asks the audience through his essay for a better and more effective idea. It simply states the narrators ironic character, who wants to change the situation and problems present in the country but his approach or the proposal that he has presented are not in any ways seems to be appropriate in a so ciety. At the end I would like to conclude mentioning that Swift’s approach to solve the miserable situation of Ireland was very cruel and inhuman

The Meaning of Meaning Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

The Meaning of Meaning - Essay Example The traditional study of natural language leaves much to be desired in the philosophical realm. While they have discovered certain universal features which appear to be species-specific, and have some idea about the structure of language, it remains to be seen as to whether any of this is actually naturistic of language, or more associated with actual cognitive learning approaches and syntax. The question raised most often by philosophy is what about the meaning of words; where does it originate. It’s not that meanings don’t exist per se, but rather that they take a different form than what we usually intend when we say meaning. Word meanings are more inaccurate than sentence meanings. For this reason we often have to gain the meaning of words through their contextual surroundings. Previous philosophers have postulated that sentence meanings should be addressed first in attempting to discover the meaning of words; however, if the word has different connotations between societies, then no amount of studying the meaning of a sentence will bring one closer to the real meaning of a term. Traditional philosophers postulated that there are two applications of words; one in the actual term, and the other in its significance or sense. The actual term has been thought of as the extension of a descriptive concept; the actuality of everything belonging to that one descriptive set and whatever is true for that set. The significance or sense of a term involves whatever is intentioned by that term. Words cannot be defined concretely as there are always variances of significance despite the terms used.

Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 16

Assignment Example Over the years based on the changing needs and the changing geographical distribution, the Reserve Bank has added newer branches to accommodate the change. Currently based on the demand and the need, the West Coast has been able to manage with just one branch in San Francisco. Hence the main reason for just one branch is due to the ‘need bases’ (The Federal Reserve Board). No, the Federal Reserve does not produce the bank notes or coins and the production of the coins and notes is undertaken by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Also the U.S. Mint produces all the coins for the country. The Federal Reserve only works on putting the notes and coins in circulation (The Federal Reserve Board). a) Kevin M Warsh: He joined the board on 24th February 2006, and has an unexpired term ending on 31st January 2018. Prior to being a part of the board he worked as a Special Assistant for the President of Economic Policy and as Executive Secretary of the National Economic Council for a period of 4 years ending February 2006. HHisHis work is mainly focused on the domestic finance, banking, securities and also consumer protection (Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System). b) Elizabeth A Duke: Elizabeth joined the board on 5th August 2008, and has an unexpired term ending on 31st January 2012. Before joining the board she was a part of TowneBank, as a Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer. Also she has a wide background in the Banking industry and has worked for Banks like Wachovia Bank, SouthTrust Bank and also as a part of Bank of Tidewater (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Alan Greenspan, the ex chairman of Federal Reserve Bank was replaced by Ben S Bernanke. Bernanke is also the Chairman for the Federal Open Market Committee and is currently in his second term, which ends on 31st January 2014. Before becoming the Chairman of the Reserve Bank, he was at the position of Chairman of the

Issues in Child Development Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Issues in Child Development - Essay Example I would also discuss how this policy would support the current policies already in place. Body Children have basic rights as human beings and these rights mostly refer to the special protection afforded them as young individuals (Amnesty International, 2011). These rights include the right to human identity, basic needs for food, education, health care, and criminal laws appropriate to their age and development. Their rights also include freedom from physical, mental, and emotional abuse (Amnesty International, 2011). The politics of childhood is often based on the appropriate learning which can be applied to the different students from different races, cultures, and religions, in one school system or even in one classroom (Morris, 2011). It is also sometimes based on how children are perceived by other members of society, and with children not being afforded the same entitlements in rights as their adult counterparts. Furthermore, these children are also perceived as similar to each other in terms of learning ability and capacity. However, not all students have the same capacity or pace in learning (Haskvitz, 2011). Some children may indeed be smart and be fast learners; however, others may be slow learners and may take a while to learn concepts. Other children rest may be adept in other areas of learning. For example, some may be math whizzes, but be terrible in English or science, or be excellent in English, but be terrible at Math. The important point to consider is that there are different elements which have to be considered in teaching children (Haskvitz, 2011). And by managing these considerations and integrating the necessary changes into the learning process, it is possible to achieve the best learning conditions for children. Educational Policy based on the immediate rewards system Rationale: This policy was chosen because it seeks to provide immediate rewards and reinforcement for learning and growing children. I chose this as an applicable policy f or children because children have short attention spans and short-term memories. The best way to reinforce a positive behaviour is to immediately reward or praise it (Domjan, 2003, p. 45). A policy which is therefore based on immediate rewards or reinforcement is the easiest way of ensuring an effective learning process. Goal: To provide an effective and appropriate educational curriculum and policy for children based on a strong and immediate rewards and reinforcement system. Implementation 1. This policy would first require teachers to undergo training in the proper and effective rewards, reinforcement, and punishment system in their teaching styles. This training shall be undertaken with the assistance of educational and psychological experts who shall guide the teachers in the proper and effective ways of rewarding, reinforcing, and punishing their students. If possible, this training should also be integrated in the educational systems of colleges and universities offering teac hing courses. The sooner that this rewards system can be integrated into the education of teachers, the better for the students and the children. 2. This policy then needs to be gradually integrated into the curriculum of students. It is a policy which would not require a complete or significant overhaul of the UK educational system. Changes needed would be on the rewards and reinforcement given to students. This rewards system

Tourism Industry Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 5250 words

Tourism Industry - Research Paper Example It was gauged to be 60.4% free. Starting a business requires 63 days compared to a world average of 48 days. Acquiring licenses is relatively easier than shutting down a buiness.However, the national regulatory environment exercises considerable control over the freedom to start, operate and close a business venture. Financial freedom is a measure of banking security as well as the extent of government intervention. State ownership of financial entities like banks and insurance companies has adverse effects on the free functioning of the market. On the financial front there is substantial State interference in the UAE.There are restrictions on foreign ownership(with a cap of 49% on foreign stake)of companies listed on the stock exchange, while some companies prohibit foreign ownership altogether. There are 21 domestic banks and 26 foreign banks currently and no new bank licenses have been issued since the mid eighties. The insurance sector has been closed to foreign companies since the late eighties, currently there are 47 insurance companies nearly half of them are foreign. The capital market is relatively developed with two stock exchanges. There is skepticism about foreign ownership and financial policies are restrictive. Investment freedom-30% Investment freedom is essentially an evaluation of the free flow of capital, especially foreign capital. Foreign investment in UAE is subject to constrains. It is mandatory for a UAE national to hold 51% ownership in every company, except the ones located in the free zones. Foreign investors do not receive national treatment. There are limitations on land ownership also, with the Non Gulf Co-operation Council nationals being barred from owning lands.Furthermore; only 22 out of 53 stocks on the UAE stock market are open to foreign investment. However there are no controls on current transfers, foreign exchange access or repatriation of profits. Because of excessive controls, the investment climate in UAE is deemed adverse to foreign investments. Freedom from Corruption-62% Includes an assessment of the prevalence and degree of administrative and judicial corruption at the government level. Corruption is prevalent though not in a significant degree. The UAE was ranked 38th out of 158 countries in the Transparency International Corruptions Perception in 2005. Taxation Environment-99.9% It is a measure of the burden of individual and corporate taxes as well the proportion of tax revenue of the government to the total GDP. The UAE taxation regime is reasonably conducive for business growth. There is no income tax and no federal level corporate tax; however the tax structure for foreign banks and oil companies is different. Foreign oil companies are liable to pay a 55% corporate tax whereas a 20% corporate tax is levied on foreign banks. The Government imposes a rental tax and a 7%-12% federal level value added tax is being contemplated. Tax revenue of the

Car Culture in Log Angeles Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

Car Culture in Log Angeles - Research Paper Example It has the longest sea port and its economy is mainly fueled by international trade and entertainment. Apart from that, it is very developed in many other fields, such as aerospace, medicine, finance, telecommunications etc. Plus, Los Angeles is one of the largest cities in the United States. It is sprawled over a vast area and the topography is quite mountainous. These factors are reason enough to understand why car culture is quite dominant here. With people facing little economic or financial issues, the majority of the population can afford to own a car, hence, public transport is very limited. It is a great challenge for a foreigner to adjust in the city of Los Angeles. A foreigner is very likely to get overwhelmed by its vast sprawl, fascinations, lights and attractions. Therefore, foreigners must be dealt with great sensitivity. American residents are so adjusted in their lives that they pay little attention to foreigners who grapple to adjust in the huge and vivacious city. T he Pedestrian is a short story by Ray Badbury in which he describes how people change after they start living in the city of LosAngeles. It is a futuristic depiction about a man named Mr. Mead who was a new immigrant in the city of Los Angeles and was not much prone to the city culture. He loved exploring things at night. He did not like to disturb any one and would quietly set out in the streets for walking and enjoying the cold breeze. However, this piece represents good sarcasm on how the world has changed today. People who enjoy the beauty of nature are rarely appreciated, rather they are considered to be maniacs or psychotics, just like Mr. Mead was considered to be mentally ill. The story also proposes good sarcasm on the ever decreasing value of books, magazines and journals. People today rarely find pleasure in getting physical books and reading them. Rather, they resort to reading the e-version from the internet. The libraries have suddenly become so outdated and no one wan ts to visit them. If we keep on continuing with the same trend, there will come a time in 2052 when we will reach a stage where we can perfectly relate to the story predicted by The Pedestrian. Individuals today rely more upon the entertainment they find on the internet. They download books from their iPhones through iTunes and read them, as it is so much more convenient. Hence, a person who is alienated from technology in the world of today will be treated as a stranger, just like Mr. Mead has been treated in The Pedestrian. Also, nowadays, people consider it abnormal to walk down the streets during night. People at large have become so insecure that they’d get scared if they see a man walking down their streets just randomly. Everyone has a dog which barks at even a slight movement. This is because of an every growing crime rate which is due to wide disparity between different segments of the population. With the growth in technology, nuclear families and globalization, peo ple have moved further away from the beauty of nature. This story also presents a very interesting phenomenon, known as â€Å"Culture shock†. People, when they migrate to foreign lands, find it hard to settle in. There are many problems that they face as a result of their migration. Logistical and lingual issues are just two of them. They undergo feelings of fear, unease, discomfort, agitation and frustration as a result of being implanted in a completely new setting and a

The History of Weapons Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words

The History of Weapons - Essay Example History have been developed in to what it is today by these weapon of annihilation. These weapons have eternally changed our world. Technological and scientific development has contributed to the development of all new advanced weapons. In the course of history, weapons have played a crucial role in the transformation and changing of society. Weapons were cause of destruction of civilization and also creation of new ones. The evolution of multifarious weapons describes the development of technology implemented by ancestors over the course of history. The main intension of development of weapons was to make it as powerful as possible to capture lands and enslave other people. This essay will discuss about the history of weapons. During ancient days, Egypt was at its peak but was invaded by the Hyksos by their superior weapons which were made of iron. These innovation and tactical brilliance at that point of time amazed the Egyptians. Earlier days, people used to use weapons to protect themselves and hunt for food. But mostly weapons were used to fight against each other for land, religion and power. Earlier days weapons were simple such as rocks and sharp sticks. Fighting was mainly between the throwing distances of enemy. But gradually weapons were developed in to more destructive and efficient. Guns were used in this century.String of the gun was wet through in saltpeter and then slow match was touched to the gunpowder so that it could ignite. The Wheelock was invented in early 16th century. Gunpowder is ignited by spark which is generated by a metal wheel that spun against an iron pyrites. Because of this most of the cavalry stopped using lances. Instead of lances they used to carry three or four pistol each. But the traditional English weapon used to be a longbow (O’Bryan, 2013). Longbow was around before it was used by the English. But it was never used as efficiently it was used by the English. At that time, most bows

Impact of technology in an organization Article Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Impact of technology in an organization - Article Example The other challenges include how to have proper incentives as well as team work. Some universities are still using a system, which is traditional and in turn, it has made the mass markets become exhausted. Organization structure is affected if it does not employ the use of information technology (Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1997). Most of the employees who work in universities, which are traditional, are not happy with changes related to the existing organization structure and coming up with an organization, which is virtual. There is usually a need in universities to ensure that people are united, in order to increase their productivity. The theory of social action is extremely useful in knowing the impact technology has had on the universities. This is because their failures and successes are easily made known. According to Brynjolfsson and Hitt, organizations are forced to obey authority, which is decentralized. The latter is as a result of the impact of Information technology. Furthermo re, they believe that transmission of knowledge becomes cheap as a result of IT. Universities are now ensuring that all their departments are connected, in order to increase efficiency. Rights for making decisions are thus allocated to the entire optimum knowledge chamber, which exists (Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1997). ... In order to obtain information, there is a central agent. It is vital in matters related to cost saving as well as its benefits. The disadvantage is that those involved in decision making especially the central ones are the ones who lose a lot. Decentralization occurs as a result of efficiency, which is induced. Decentralization is affected by the presence of decision makers who are multiple (Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1997). On the other hand, Baroudi and Lucbas believe that there is a link between organizational design and IT design. There are many ways, which tasks can be coordinated, as well as be divided in order to increase productivity. The process of organizational design can also be used because it advocates for management decentralization (Lucas & Baroudi, 1994). This means that all the employees working in the university will be involved in decision making. Span control is an element of a variable used in the design process. At the different universities there will be many peopl e in management and they have to report to their heads. In every organizational chart, every employee’s job titles are made known and can easily be altered. The latter can easily be achieved as compared to strategy, culture and behavior. The frame work of social action advocates for constructs, which are key in any university. The most vital aspects of any organization should be technology, structure, tasks and people. Technology plays an essential role in bringing about changes in the universities structure. This means that there is a direct relation between organization form and IT. Relationships, which exist in firms, are due to communications as well as computers. In modern times, universities are seeking to become hybrid as compared to before when they were

Slavery in the 1840s Essay Example for Free

Slavery in the 1840s Essay Slavery was always a controversial issue in America. Many people saw slavery as an essential part of life in every aspect, while others saw it as immoral and an injustice to humanity. In the 1840s when Manifest Destiny started to thrive, things began to heat up. New territories meant a possibility for a new slave or free state in America. Because the new territories were allowed the right of popular sovereignty to determine whether they would have slaves or not, abolitionists and non-abolitionists were at a constant battle to gain a new state. Abolitionists wanted slavery diminished in America all together. They gave several arguments to prove their point on why slavery should be abolished. Firstly they stated that slavery was un-Christian. The book of Genesis stated that man was created in the image of God, so all men were created equal. Thus they claimed that anyone that owned slaves would go straight to hell for not adhering to the rules of God that all were equal. Another argument they came about was from a patriotic standpoint from which America was created. The Declaration of Independence states that all men are created equal, but with slavery and a flee for freedom in the nation, it was easily contradicted. As such, Abolitionists called slavery un-American. Another point made by the Abolitionists was that slavery gave unlimited power to slave holders. They could treat slaves however they chose because there were no laws protecting slaves. This is turn corrupted their moral values, according to Abolitionists. In economic viewpoints, slavery was still cruel and wicked to Abolitionists. They argued that free labor would be more beneficial because it would inspire competition and foreign investments and that it would appeal to immigrants. Abolitionists also said that it interfered with free and open trade to the north, which were anti-slavery states and businesses. Another point made was that slavery was politically dangerous because there was always a likelihood that salves could rebel. A massive slave rebellion would lead to a racial war in the United States that no one wanted. While Abolitionists argued their points, Pro-slavery groups gave very good rebuttals. Economically they argued that the end to slavery would kill the economy in the south. Without slaves in the fields collecting and caring for the produce, everything would collapse. Cotton, tobacco, and rice would all fail in the economy and the south would be in economic ruin. Another point pro-slavery people argued was what would happen if slaves were to be let free. They stated that if they were freed, unemployment would rise and there would be an abundance of chaos. All of this would lead to uprisings and bloodshed. Yet another argument that the defenders of slavery used was influenced with history. They claimed that slavery had been a part of history for so long and had become a natural state of mankind. History showed that Greeks, Romans, and English (until recently) had slaves and as such it was a part of human nature. Pro-slavery groups, like Abolitionists, also used religion and the bible as an argument. According to the bible Abraham had slaves, Paul returned a run-away slave in the New Testament, and Jesus never spoke out about slavery though it was widespread. Also non-Abolitionists argued that slaves were better cared for compared to factory workers in the North and the poor people of Europe. They indicated that slave owners would protect and help their slaves when they became sick or aged, unlike others who were left helplessly to fend for themselves once they were fired or released. The slave revolt of 1831 led by Nat Turner gave pro-slavery groups a lift in their arguments. It showed that slavery should be continued to keep the slaves in check and keep a watchful eye on them, to prevent any other chaotic events, which no one sought for. As is shown, slavery was a notorious issue that couldn’t be ignored and slowly spiraled out of control. The issue really started to get out of hand in the 1840s with new territories and the revival of religion in the Second Great Awakening. Both Abolitionists and Pro-slavery groups had arguments that caused a lot of uncertainty throughout the country, and especially in the new territories which were given the choice of slaves or no slaves. All of these arguments, issues and uncertainties that were widespread in the nation were the underlying cause of severe disunity between the North and South and eventually the Civil War.

How death penalty can prevent repeat offenders

How death penalty can prevent repeat offenders Sentence to death penalty seldom arises in criminal cases like murder, robbery with violence, forgery amongst others. This paper shall look into: How death penalty can prevent repeat offenders, how it provides justice, how it acts as deterrent when properly implemented, the costs associated to the victims and the offenders; and finally how the long justice process associated with it affect or help the offended. Origin of death penalty This is dated back to 18th century, in the code of king Hammaurabi of Babylon that involved death penalty of 25 different cases. Death penalty was as well part of 14th Century B.Cs Hittite Code, this made death penalty as the punishment for crimes, and such were done through beating, stoning, and burning alive and other crude methods  [1]  . This was later replaced with hanging. The cases that led to death penalties included marrying a Jew, failure to confess sins and treason; these mainly took place in Britain. In Britain, this law was reformed due to severity of the death sentence; this took place in1823 to 1837 by allowing a number of offenders free. Britain influenced America to adopt the capital punishment even for the slightest crime like stealing the grapes .Though in US it varied from state to state. A leading Case of death Penalty In Clark Circuit Court, a case involving a 23 year old Christian and her 11 month baby. These were allegedly murdered by Zachariah the husband and the father of the victims. He stuffed the two in a plastic bag. Autopsy revealed the wife was strangled to death and the child died out of suffocation. Meanwhile Zachariah was out on supervised probation on charges of burglary  [2]  . He admitted to have committed the crime; pled guilty of three counts of murder, and was sentence to life imprisonment with no parole on count, life imprisonment with no parole on count, and 65 years of imprisonment on a fixed term on count. Death Penalty prevents future offenders or murderers The society must lead in fighting for the fundamental rights and freedom of people and this include right to life and hence anyone trying to take this away should be capitally punished to avoid those prospecting to commit the same  [3]  . According to a report by Michigan State University Lab and Death Penalty Information Centre, 2000 -2004.The rates of murders reduces with more convictions of murderers. Though the slow process of justice delays determination of the case affecting the outcome; death penalties need to be fast to be a sure way of deterring the criminals. Ironically, some states do not have death penalties and still record lower criminal cases, but this should not be used as an argument for this vice. This, if allowed for example in the U.S; things can be worst; in that even with death penalties crime rates are still high. Generally, this report concludes that most people fear death and hence death penalty can be used to prevent further criminal acts in the society. Death Penalty does not prevent future offenders or murderers In the above report, it is believed that the society isnt happy with death penalties, and hence its practice may increase the likelihood of more murders. In America, states that do not apply the death penalties have generally lower crime rates including murder cases. Besides, in most European countries and in Canada there are fewer cases of murder compared to the America yet; they do not use the death penalty as the capital punishment for murder. Most of the offenders normally do not consider the death penalty before the actual murder because they commit this out of anger or through drug influence. In America it is reported that most the murder related cases are link to substance abuse. Infact, most states in America have adopted the sentence of life in jail without parole, and hence the offenders will never be released thereby; the security of the society is assured, most of whom tend to settle down in life as prisoners and are rarely a threat again to the community, as opposed to d eath penalty that society perceive to be brutal and in human. Alternatives to death penalty The death penalty has been an issue of great concern among most of the Americans and policymakers have been trying to devise alternatives. The various alternatives have been contested heavily by both the proponents and the opponents. However, there is an overarching concern among most of the America and that the death penalty must be dispensed with and this emanates from both the moral and legal platforms. According to opinion polls carried out in America today there a strong support for the abolition of the death penalty and most of the Americans are advocating for its abolition. The death penalty has been blamed for being used as a tool of racial injustice in the criminal justice system. Alternatives to death penalty include: life imprisonment without parole and restitution, this is less costly than death sentence an keeps the offender away from the society. Restitution, the prisoner will be working while in jail and all the money made goes back to support the family of the victim. Another solution though, controversial is allowing the offenders after serving the jail term to go back to the society where they continue working in the community to support victims family post-release restitution. Rehabilitation or reformatories can also be put in place, this has been used to reform young offenders under the age of twenty; turning their lives around  [4]  . It is as well suggested to be applied to reform the older offenders. Costs of death penalty Privately appealing a capital offence is expensive and hence the poor may not be able get justice, tax money is also used to keep offenders in jail of whom some may be innocent. Most of the offenders and their relatives suffer emotional stress during the slow justice process  [5]  . The death penalty is regarded as an excessive to law and is socially and morally degrading. Recommendations Life is regarded extremely sacred in the society, this does not matter how one kills another. Hanging one in name of crime, however much it could be legal sparks debate. The alternative death penalties described in this paper should not be used by offenders as a gap to commit crime. I still recommend stiffer penalties that could help deter further criminal activities. The rehabilitation and reformation recommendations is a good idea because in most cases under -age offenders involved in such crimes may have acted oblivious of the outcome or accidentally; and hence this opportunity can be used to mould their character other than throwing them to jail; on the contrary , this should not used as a correction tool to adult murderers. Life imprisonment without parole and restitution may be another noble alternative; but it may present a lop-hole in post-release restitution; where the offenders if not supervised well could revert to their usual criminal act. Conclusion This paper has generally discussed death sentence and its results in the society in broader terms. The main issue that, compromises this situation is the enaction of the idea in some countries or states while others do not see it as a good way for correcting a criminal. The option taken by a nation to deter murder should not go against the social ethics or believe; that life is God given. Both schools of thoughts against or for death penalty; should try to reach a common ground to avoid escalarating criminal activities or increasing mortality rate by; either failing to create measures to curb illegality or hanging the murderers respectively.However one fact stands out from the debate, that the death penalty has failed to achieve the intended results that it was intended to and as a result there is a general need for its complete abolition.

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process. Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process.